Russia looking East Policy || Daily Current Affairs

Description

Context: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared last month that although the European Union (EU) was Russia’s biggest trading and investment partner, Moscow was ready to break ties with the EU after criticism of the jailing of Opposition figure Alexei Navalny.

Details:

Russia worked with the EU in only a few areas, dealings with the EU were “sporadic” and related mainly to energy and foreign policy issues such as Syria and Iran.
The Kremlin later mitigated the Minister’s comments, denying that severance of diplomatic contacts was imminent.

Where Europe went wrong:

Europe’s mistake in dealing with Russia after the reunification of Germany in 1990 was in expecting it to westernise unilaterally.
This ignored Gorbachev’s warning that the states of Europe belong to different social systems; recognition of this fact and respect for the sovereign right of each people to choose their social system are the most important prerequisites.
After its transitory revival in the 1990s, the objective of a common European home remains as unrealisable as ever.
The West’s support for the 2014 Ukraine uprising, and the NATO and EU’s relentless forward policy in States bordering Russia are intensely resented in Moscow, and the EU’s claim to a monopoly of European values and identity fuels this animosity.
The Kremlin’s Greater Europe concept has now been replaced by the more feasible Greater Eurasia Initiative, with Russia looking East for economic connectivity and institutional integration.

The Russian liberals:

Ever since the French Revolution, the Napoleonic period and the Decembrist revolt against the Tsar, Russia has been suspicious about liberal political movements, thereby obliging Russian liberals to identify with foreign counterparts and appearing as a fifth column.
Upon Russia’s humiliation in its war with Japan in 1905, Russian liberals sent messages congratulating the Japanese Emperor, and used the hardships of the First World War to delegitimize the authority of the Tsar, although it was the Bolsheviks who seized power in the ensuing chaos.
Russia’s exclusion from post-Cold War Europe revived its distrust of domestic liberals, who drew encouragement from western support for colour revolutions and anticipated regime change during every street protest in Russia.

Conclusion:

The Moscow visit by the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell that provoked Mr. Lavrov’s outburst demonstrates that efforts to reset relations are compromised when mutual expectations about the form and nature of ties are far apart.
Moscow rejects EU efforts to intervene in its domestic affairs while the EU feels disrespected and rebuffed.
Russia is transitioning from Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia, and diplomatic disengagement may be expedient until the new reality is understood.
Paradoxically, Russia’s emphasis on Greater Eurasia might improve the climate for Russian liberals, because a responsible liberal presence in the Russian political system is necessary, and could come about by decoupling liberalism from great power competition.
India, under ever-closer international scrutiny over its human rights abuses, should scrutinise the EU-Russia stand-off and draw the relevant conclusions.