INDIA NEED FLEXIBLE NUCLEAR POLICY: CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD

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Context

Evolving global power dynamics, technological advancements, and threat perceptions require India to reassess its 2003 nuclear doctrine.

India’s Current Nuclear Doctrine

India’s nuclear policy, approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in January 2003 and based on the 1999 draft by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).

Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD): Maintains a survivable, ready, and sufficient nuclear arsenal capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any aggressor.  

No First Use (NFU): Commits to using nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on its territory or forces.

Massive Retaliation: Any nuclear strike against India would trigger a “massive” retaliatory response aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage.

Non-Use Against Non-Nuclear States: Pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states but retains the right to respond with nuclear force in case of major biological or chemical attacks.

Civilian Political Control: Prime Minister, through the Nuclear Command Authority’s Political Council, holds exclusive authority to order a nuclear strike.

Nuclear Triad: India maintains land, air, and sea-based nuclear capabilities—through Agni missiles, air-delivered weapons, and nuclear submarines like INS Arihant—ensuring credible second-strike capacity.

Commitment to Disarmament: India advocate for a verifiable and non-discriminatory global disarmament framework.

Why India need Flexibility in Nuclear Doctrine?

Changing Regional Security Dynamics

China’s Modernization: China’s nuclear arsenal has grown with projections of over 1,000 warheads by 2030.. (Source: U.S. Department of Defense)

• This modernization challenges India’s CMD framework, which must evolve to maintain credible deterrence.

Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs): Pakistan's "full spectrum deterrence" strategy, incorporating low-yield TNWs, challenges India's "massive retaliation" doctrine by necessitating graded response options to avoid disproportionate escalation.

Emerging Domains: Cyber and Space

Cyber Threats: Increasing digital dependence exposes India’s nuclear command, control, and communication (C3) systems to potential cyber attacks. 

• Disruptions could delay retaliation, compromise security, or invite first-strike vulnerabilities.

Space Vulnerabilities: India’s reliance on space assets for communication, navigation, and surveillance adds another layer of risk. 

• The current doctrine doesn’t address how India would respond to cyber or space-based attacks that cripple its deterrent capabilities.

Limited Credibility

NFU Debate: Critics argue that a rigid NFU policy limits India’s ability to deter adversaries who might exploit first-strike advantages. 

Massive Retaliation Dilemma: A strict commitment to massive retaliation leaves little room for calibrated or proportional responses, especially in cases of limited nuclear use. 

Potential Flexibilities India Could Consider

Conditional No First Use (CNFU)

India could adopt a CNFU policy, maintaining its general commitment to not initiating nuclear strikes but extending it to cover non-nuclear attacks that damage national infrastructure. 

Flexible Response or Proportional Retaliation

India may opt for a measured nuclear response, matching an adversary's attack in intensity and target, instead of a massive retaliation. 

This strategy could boost deterrence, especially against tactical nuclear weapons, but poses challenges in defining proportionality and maintaining control.

Enhanced Strategic Ambiguity

India could adopt strategic ambiguity to deter adversaries by making its retaliatory thresholds unclear, thus complicating their strategic planning. 

This approach, however, requires careful management to prevent misunderstandings and accidental escalation.

Strengthening Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

An effective BMD system would strengthen India's second-strike capability by safeguarding nuclear weapons from an initial enemy attack; strengthening the credibility of CMD strategy.

Integrating Space and Cyber Deterrence

Doctrine must include space and cyberspace deterrence, with offensive and defensive measures to protect nuclear command-and-control and critical infrastructure.  

Challenges to Revision

International Image

India’s NFU stance reinforces its reputation as a responsible nuclear power, helping secure global partnerships and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) support. Diluting NFU could invite diplomatic backlash.

Strategic Stability

NFU reduces incentives for a preemptive strike and prevents an arms race. Abandoning it could destabilize the regional balance.

Escalation Risks

Ambiguity in doctrine might lead to miscalculation during crises.

Economic Costs

Moving toward a first-use posture would require vast financial investment in high-alert systems and advanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) networks.

Ethical Considerations

India’s commitment to restraint aligns with its moral and historical emphasis on peace and non-violence.

Way Forward

India should update its nuclear doctrine to address current threats by adopting a conditional No First Use policy and a flexible response. This requires political consensus, diplomatic skill, and technological advancement, balancing clarity with ambiguity. 

Continuous review, international communication, and modernization are essential to maintain credibility and India's reputation as a responsible nuclear power committed to disarmament.

Source: INDIAN EXPRESS